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With the death of Âli Paşa in 1871, the myriad of issues and problems that 
had been simmering for some time erupted in the power vacuum, and the 
Tanzimat policies – political, administrative and financial – all began, one by 
one, to collapse. In this atmosphere of perpetual crises, the ideals and policies 
that had been supported and implemented by the advocates of the Tanzimat 
regime began to be questioned and the search for new, alternative solutions 
and new political options began to surface. The crisis reached its most critical 
levels from 1875 onwards, with the empire entering a period that can only be 
characterized as chaotic. The state treasury had all but collapsed, unable to 
repay the loans that had been intermittently issued since the Crimean War; a 
series of insurgencies had begun to break out in the Balkan provinces, in 
which huge investments had been made in an attempt to prevent their seces-
sion; the European Great Powers had initiated a major offensive on the dip-
lomatic front; a palace coup had taken place in an attempt to initiate the con-
stitutional regime; three sultans had been crowned in succession in the space 
of three months; and, finally, the army had been thoroughly routed in a war 
with Russia.
2
 As a result of the treaty of Berlin, which formally ended the war 
in July 1878, the Ottoman Empire lost significant swathes of territory, as well 
as population. 
 
It was in the midst of such circumstances and at such a time that 
Abdülhamid II ascended the throne in late August 1876. With a particular 
emphasis on the links between domestic and foreign events, it is possible to 
classify and evaluate Sultan Abdülhamid’s domestic policy under the follow-
ing six periods: 1876-1878, 1878-1882, 1882-1891, 1891- 1987, 1897-1902, 
and 1902-1908. 
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1) The period of 1876-1878 
 
In the period commencing with his ascension to the throne until the end of the 
Russo -Ottoman War of 1877- 1878, Abdülhamid remained faithful, on the 
whole, to the ideals and principles of the Tanzimat and, to an extent, to those 
of the Young Ottomans, and he continued to collaborate with the existing 
administration, which consisted of members of the various schools and affilia-
tions associated with Tanzimat. In other words, the sultan generally consented 
to whatever his existing administration proposed to him (especially in terms 
of the war effort) and implemented their proposals. For instance, faith in the 
ideals of the constitutionalists was maintained, whilst a traditional Tanzimat 
foreign policy focusing on relations with Britain was pursued, despite a num-
ber of setbacks. 
 
Nevertheless, it must also be emphasized that this period, from the 
point of view of both domestic and foreign policy, was also one in which the 
sultan was to observe and examine his existing corps of state elites; a period 
in which the sultan could learn the ropes, as it were, and become accustomed 
to his role and those around him. After this tumultuous two-year period of 
numerous disasters, and the signing, in particular, of the Treaty of Berlin in 
July 1878, Abdülhamid learned a number of lessons and he began to lay the 
foundations that would augment his rule. It was during this period that he be-
gan formulating his own principles, selecting his own staff and stamping his 
personal authority on domestic and foreign policy. 
 
The six months between the signing of the Armistice of Edirne (31 
January 1878) and the signing of the Treaty of Berlin (13 July 1878) repre-
sented one of the most critical periods for Abdülhamid’s reign. To better 
grasp the depth and extent of the despondency that took hold at this time, it 
may help to recall the events of this critical period, which also paved the way 
for the establishment of the Abdülhamid regime: The Armistice of Edirne (31 
January 1878); The dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies (13 February 
1878); The Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878); The Çırağan Incident (an 
attempted coup to depose Abdülhamid) (20 May 1878); The cession of Cyp-
rus to Britain (4 June 1878); The Conference and subsequent Treaty of Berlin 
(13 June-13 July 1878). In terms of impact and consequences for the 
Abdülhamid regime, the two most significant events in the above list were the 
dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and the Çırağan Incident. 
 
Although the sultan had, with the support of leading government fig-
ures, abolished the Chamber of Deputies during an extraordinary February in 
1878, it can be said that he had, up to 1881, entertained the idea of reinstitut-
ing the chamber. The continuation, although admittedly intermittent, of the 
office of the Prime Minister (başvekil); the preservation, until April 1880, of 
appointees to the Senate; and the establishment of a commission in April 1880 
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to oversee amendments to the Constitution of 1876 may be cited as precursors 
to a possible re-opening of the Chamber of Deputies.3 
 
The Çırağan Incident in May 1878 was an undoubtedly critical event 
for the Abdülhamid regime. According to İ bnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnal, the 
event represented the starting point of Abdülhamid’s turn to autocratic rule; 
after the incident, doubt reigned supreme and the sultan began to suspect all 
those around him, even those whom he had previously known to have trusted. 
Immediately after the attempted coup, Abdülhamid had those whom he sus-
pected, or, indeed, found wanting, appointed governors of distant provinces 
and thus removed from the imperial capital. Amongst these figures were 
Küçük Said Pasha, Chairman of the Senate, who was first appointed to the 
Governorship of Ankara and then, after he objected to the post, the Governor-
ship of Bursa; the ‘Prime Minister’ Mehmed Sadık Pasha, appointed Gover-
nor of the Vilayet of the Archipelago (Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid); Mehmed Akif 
Pasha, who was appointed Governor of Konya; ‘English’ Said Pasha, the 
Lord Chamberlain (Mabeyn Müşiri), appointed Governor of Ankara, and; 
Mehmed Nafiz Pasha, the Chief Chamberlain (Başmabeynci), who was ap-
pointed Field Marshal at the head of the Fourth Army. Later, Damad Mahmud 
Celaleddin Pasha was also dismissed from the post of Marshal of Tophane 
(Artillery Corps) and ostensibly appointed to the governorship of Tripoli 
(Libya) in January 1879.4 
 
There is no doubt that the Çırağan Incident and similar attempted 
coups that came to light later heightened Abdülhamid’s apprehensions. Espe-
cially, the arrest in July 1878 of the Skaliyeri-Aziz Bey Committee, in which 
the Masonic Lodges were also involved, and the purging from the palace of 
some Dagestani and Circassian officers, and Dagestani troops as personal 
guards to the sultan, may also be taken into cited as evidence of this growing 
unease on the part of the Sultan.5 
 
What is also striking during this turbulent period was the continuing 
instability and reshuffling of the posts of the Başvekil (prime minister) and/or 
the Sadrazam (grand vizier), an instability that may be read as a continuation 
of the uncertainty created in the post-Âli Pasha period. In the ten-year period 
 
 
3 See Ercüment Kuran, “Başvekil,” TDVİA, V, 136-137; Carter V. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform 
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II, 928; Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, VIII: Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri, 1876-  
1907 (Ankara: TTK, 1983), 262; Atilla Çetin, Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa (Ankara: Kültür ve Tu-
rizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988), 233-234. 
4 İnal, Son Sadrazamlar, II, 772-773, 1002; Also see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Midhat Paşa ve 
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Eğinli (İngiliz) Said Paşa, Hayatı ve Hatıratı,” Osmanlı Araştırmaları, 35 (2010), 33-80.  
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between 1871 and the dismissal of Ahmet Vefik Pasha in 1882, no less than 
23 Sadrazams/Başvekils were appointed.6 
 
 
2) The period of 1878-1882 
 
The period following the Treaty of Berlin (July 1878), which, in terms of 
Abdülhamid’s personal rule and his exercise of authority, may be deemed a 
transitional period, and lasted until 1882. In this period, whilst Abdülhamid 
was questioning the policies of the Tanzimat era, he also preserved and in-
deed strengthened many of them. Nevertheless, some aspects of those policies 
and principles he held up to serious criticism, such as the policy of limitless 
borrowing, the tolerance shown towards the spread of Great Power influence 
within the empire and the incompetence shown in preventing the spread of 
separatist or nationalist movements amongst Christians in the empire, as well 
as the concomitant failure in protecting the empire’s Muslim subjects. In the 
light of this balance sheet and the lessons learnt from recent events, foreign, 
domestic and financial policies were to subsequently diverge from the path 
taken during the Tanzimat era. 
The signing of the Treaty did not mark the resolution of all outstanding 
problems as the treaty contained a number of articles and issues that merely 
postponed ultimate resolutions for a later date. Moreover, during this period, 
Abdülhamid faced various foreign, and related domestic, issues that had aris-
en after the war. These included responses and actions by the Great Powers to 
Ottoman vulnerability, such as the dispatching of naval forces to the region, 
as well as other shows of force, which culminated in the occupation of Tuni-
sia in 1881 by the French and of Egypt by the British in 1882. This period 
was one in which the young sultan tested the political possibilities of his for-
eign policy and one in which he was also able to affirm or re-evaluate the 
views regarding foreign affairs he had held in the period between 1876 and 
1878. 
 
The crucial event of this period was the Russo-Ottoman Agreement 
signed on 8 February 1879 as it was only after this date that Russian forces 
began their withdrawal, with the British navy also now leaving the Marmara 
Sea.7 Up to this point, the Abdülhamid regime was under direct physical and 
military threat and it was only after this withdrawal that resolutions to other 
outstanding issues could be decisively and effectively dealt with. The resolu-
tion of those issues that persisted after the Treaty of Berlin and the clauses of 
the treaty that were expected to be implemented, such as those pertaining to 
domestic affairs and the reform package, began after this date. Aside from the 
Russo-Ottoman Agreement of February 1879, another turning point in terms 
 
 
6 See İsmail Hami Danişmend, Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi, vol 5 (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 
1971), 85 ff. 
7 See Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, Mesail-i Mühime-i Siyasiye (Ankara: TTK, 1987), II, 115-123; Nihat 
Erim, Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri (Ankara: AÜHF, 1953), 425-427. 
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of unresolved issues outstanding after the Treaty of Berlin was the change in 
government in London and the election of Gladstone, known for his anti-
Ottoman stance, as Prime Minister (April 1880). 
 
In this context, the issues that persisted after the Treaty and which occupied 
the Abdülhamid regime from 1878 to 1882 can be examined under four dis-
tinct headings:  
İ) Remaining issues of the Treaty of Berlin  
İİ) Internal affairs  
İİİ) Proposals and attempts at 
reform IV) The sultan’s purges 
 
 
The post-Berlin treaty period (I): Remaining issues of the treaty of 
Ber-lin 
 
The Treaty of Berlin contained a number of articles that were to be negotiated 
and resolved by the relevant parties at a later date: Bosnia-Herzegovina; the 
borders of Montenegro; the Greek border; the border with Iran; and reform in 
Eastern Anatolia. 
a) Bosnia-Herzegovina: According to the Berlin Treaty (Article 25), 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be governed by Austria-Hungary, with troops 
stationed in the province. Whilst the Sanjak of Novi Pazar would remain un-
der Ottoman rule, the Austrians would have the right to station troops 
throughout the Sanjak, as well as having the right to construct military and 
commercial roads. The implementation of the article and the relevant details 
were to be finalised by the two states at a later date. Keen to implement the 
rights granted by the clause immediately, Vienna, despite objections by Istan-
bul, attempted to occupy the region before bilateral negotiations had been 
completed. Despite an armed Bosnian resistance, the occupation was com-
pleted by October 1878. When the Austrians then attempted to occupy the 
Sanjak of Novi Pazar, the Porte, which had been helpless in the occupation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, mobilized its forces and the occupation attempt was 
blocked. With the relief granted by the retreat of the Russian forces and the 
withdrawal of British naval forces (February 1879), Abdülhamid resumed 
negotiations with Vienna over the issues of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Novi 
Pazar, which he had until then deferred. After negotiations that focused on the 
mechanisms of Austrian administration and Ottoman rights in the region, the 
Austro-Ottoman Convention was signed on 21 April 1879.8  
b) The boundary with Montenegro: While ensuring the independence 
of Montenegro (Articles 26-33), the Treaty of Berlin also ceded the districts 
of Plav (Plave) and Gusinje (Gosine), which were considered Albanian terri-
tory, to Montenegro. When it became clear that the Albanian Muslims, who 
constituted the majority of these districts, would take up arms against this 
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agreement, the Porte offered another region to Montenegro, which included 
the shores of the Zim, and Hoti and Kelmend on the shores of Lake Shkodër 
(İşkodra), and a memorandum dated 12 April 1880 was signed confirming 
Montenegro’s endorsement of the offer. However, on this occasion, the Cath-
olic tribes in Albania refused to have their land ceded to Montenegro and 
when the Ottoman forces withdrew, an armed struggle began. It was the wish 
of the Great Powers to intervene and ensure that the lands were ceded to Mon-
tenegro but the uprising (April-May 1880) could not be suppressed, and fur-
thermore the sultan’s representative and envoy to the region, Marshal 
Mehmed Ali Pasha, was assassinated. A new round of intense negotiations led 
to the decision to grant the port town of Ulcinj (Ülgün) on the Adriatic coast 
(populated by Muslim and Christian Albanians) to Montenegro. However, 
while the governments continued to discuss the future of Ulcinj and how 
much of the region was to be ceded to Montenegro, the Albanians began an 
armed struggle against the Montenegrins. 
The Gladstone government invited the Great Powers in May 1880 to 
work together to actualise the pledges made regarding the Greek and Monte-
negrin borders, and the Armenian-populated provinces. In May 1880, Lord 
Goschen was appointed Ambassador and sent to Istanbul to oversee this pro-
cess. Having been applying pressure to the Porte since the summer of 1880, 
the Great Powers ensured the handover of Ulcinj by sending a joint naval 
force to the town of Dubrovnik in September 1880 as a show of force, with 
concomitant threats to occupy Izmir. It was only after the Ottoman army 
broke the Albanian resistance movement and ceded Ulcinj to Montenegro in 
November 1880 that the joint naval forces left the Adriatic.9 
 
c) The Greek border: According to the Treaty of Berlin (Article 24), 
the Greek-Ottoman border would be amended under the supervision of the 
Great Powers. With the Greeks demanding the whole of Epirus and Thessaly, 
the border dispute proved to be the most difficult issue to solve. By August 
1879, the joint Greek-Ottoman commission that had been established to de-
lineate the boundary between the two states had reached an impasse. In the 
wake of prolonged and diversionary negotiations by the Porte, the Great Pow-
ers, in a serious of conferences in line with the diplomatic offensive launched 
by the Gladstone cabinet, agreed to grant the provinces of Ioannina (Yanya) 
and Larissa (Yenişehir) to Greece (July 1880). When the Porte objected to 
this decision in August 1880, violent exchanges broke out on the Greek-
Ottoman border. After intervention by the Great Powers (in the form of naval 
forces being dispatched and the threat of occupation), and after thorny and 
prolonged negotiations, the decision was made to cede Thessaly and the re-
gion of Arta (Narda) in Epirus to Greece, with Ioannina and Preveza remain-
ing under Ottoman rule (May 1881). Although the Albanian Committees be-
gan a political and armed movement to reclaim Arta, this movement was sup- 
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pressed by the Ottoman government and its ringleaders exiled.10 
Nevertheless, quelling the unease caused by border changes on lands 
inhabited by Albani-ans in the Balkans would not prove to be easy. As shall 
be seen below, the Abdülhamid regime was also dealing with first sparks of 
nationalism and de-mands for autonomy by the Albanian elites. Securing 
order and peace in the provinces in which the Albanians resided would take a 
further two years of effort. 
 
d) The Iranian border: Having remained pro-Russian but neutral during 
the war and consequently rewarded with an invitation to the Congress of Ber-
lin, Iran, which had been pressing since 1840 for a resolution to the question 
of Ottoman-Iranian border, acquired the city of Qatur (Kotur) and its sur-
rounding lands near Van (Article 60). Despite prolonged attempts by the Porte 
to block the deal, Qatur was ceded to Iran in 1880.11  
e) Reform in Eastern Anatolia: On the questions of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro and the Greek border, Sultan Abdülhamid had ex-
hausted all his options. Exploiting differences of opinion amongst the Great 
Powers and the reactions of the local populations, the sultan did its best to 
prolong the negotiating phase; but when the Great Powers decided upon joint 
action and began issuing military threats, he conceded. The sole exception, 
the one in which there was to be no capitulation to demands and in which 
extensive delaying tactics eventually led to the question becoming all but re-
dundant, was the demand by the Great Powers for reform in the Armenian-
populated provinces of Anatolia. This shall be explored in further detail as an 
issue pertaining to domestic policy. 
 
 
The Post-Berlin Treaty Period (II): Internal Affairs 
 
Matters pertaining to domestic affairs in the dejection that followed the Treaty 
of Berlin can be examined under four headings: the question of reform in the 
Armenian-populated provinces of Anatolia; Albanian demands for autonomy; 
the issue of Arab Caliphate and the first sparks of Arabism; restoring order 
and central authority in the provinces. 
 
a) The question of reform in the Armenian-populated provinces of An-
atolia: According to the 61st article of the Treaty of Berlin, the Porte agreed to 
implement requisite reforms without delay in the provinces inhabited by its 
Armenian subjects and to guarantee the Armenians’ safety and security 
against Circassian and Kurdish bands, with a stipulation that the aforemen-
tioned reforms would be monitored by the Great Powers. London’s demands 
in this regard began soon after its acquisition of Cyprus (June 1878) and after 
the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, the demands began to rapidly increase. Sir 
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Henry Layard, the British ambassador in Istanbul, began issuing formal de-
mands, in line with the forceful and persistent attitude adopted by Lord Salis-
bury, the Foreign Minister.12 In this regard, British military consuls were sta-
tioned in numerous Anatolian provinces to monitor the enactment of the re-
forms. 
 
After the signing of the convention with Austria in April 1879 and the 
complete withdrawal of Russian forces from the Balkans in August of the 
same year, Abdülhamid was granted some breathing space and was thus more 
able to counter British demands. As a result of this successful resistance to 
pressure from London, in January 1880 Lord Salisbury capitulated and ended 
the issuing of formal demands. However, with the election of the Gladstone 
government in April 1880, the process was resumed. From May 1880, when 
the newly appointed Ambassador to the Porte Lord Goschen first arrived in 
Istanbul to oversee the process, to June 1881, when he was recalled, pressure 
from London was sustained. The third phase of this process continued until at 
least the beginning of 1882, with the efforts of Lord Dufferin, who had been 
appointed ambassador to the Porte in September 1881. Anglo-Ottoman rela-
tions also underwent a major shift in priorities during this period as a result of 
the Urabi Revolt (1879-1882) that had broken out in Egypt. In February 1882, 
British military consuls in Anatolia were recalled back to London and the 
issue was not raised again until the 1890’s. 
 
b) Albanian demands for autonomy: From the spring of 1877, in other 
words, before the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman war, security concerns and 
calls for autonomy had arisen in four Albanian provinces– Shkodër (İşkodra), 
Ioannina (Yanya), Kosovo and Manastır (Bitola). Concerns began to be 
voiced as to what the fate of these provinces would be were the empire to 
collapse, with concomitant fears that the provinces would be surrendered and 
ceded to the neighbouring countries. The Albanian elites debated the various 
solutions and responses on two principal demands– uniting the four provinces 
into a single, larger Albanian province, and demands for administrative au-
tonomy. The Albanian response after the Treaty of San Stefano, when their 
worst fears were realized and their territories were ceded to neighbouring 
states, was swift. The League of Prizren, founded at the Congress of Prizren 
that convened on 10 June 1878, formally ratified the demands mentioned 
above and conveyed these demands in the form of countless petitions sent to 
Istanbul.  
The Treaty of Berlin, which replaced those of the Treaty of San Stefa-
no, included similar articles pertaining to the Albanians and again, the re-
sponse was immediate: on the one hand, resistance and the armed defence of 
lands that had been formally ceded to Montenegro and Greece continued, 
while on the other, demands were made throughout the period 1878 to 1881 
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for autonomy and cultural rights as formulated by the League of Prizren. So 
long as the Abdülhamid regime was embroiled in negotiations with the Great 
Powers, it supported the idea of a single, unified Albanian province but was 
utterly against the notion of autonomy, at any cost. 
When the situation began to spiral out of control and the remaining is-
sues with the Great Powers had been resolved, and in the face of threats by 
the Great Powers of naval intervention and occupation, the Sultan suppressed 
the Albanian insurgency against Montenegro and Greece through military 
force (November 1880). It was, however, only when the border dispute with 
Greece had been settled (March 1881), that Abdülhamid began moving 
against the League of Prizren. He did not hesitate in resorting to military force 
in March and April 1881, when the League of Prizren was growing in bellig-
erence, nor was he afraid to employ a ‘carrot and stick’ policy of promises of 
reward mingled with threats of exile and expulsion towards the Albanian no-
tables.13 It was only after 1902, with the outbreak of unrest in Macedonia, that 
Albanian nationalist movement once more became a pressing concern.  
c) The issue of Arab Caliphate and the first sparks of Arab na-
tionalism: This issue has three dimensions. The first was a process that had 
begun amongst some Arab urban notables and intellectuals in Ottoman Syria 
mirroring the currents in the Albanian provinces. The concerns that had 
emerged regarding the sustainability and viability of the Ottoman state during 
the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1877 and the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878 had 
now turned into discussions and debates amongst certain Arab urban notables 
and intellectuals regarding their future. What may be considered as the first 
sparks of Arab nationalism began to be seen in Ottoman Syria, especially in 
Damascus and Beirut. Seeing a situation unfold that was potentially as dan-
gerous as that which had occurred in the Albanian provinces, Abdülhamid 
was firm in his quest for a resolution to this issue.14 The second dimension of 
this issue was a series of discussions that had commenced in Britain regarding 
the caliphate and had continued since 1877. Discussions regarding the validity 
and legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate, along with suggestions that the cali-
phate was an Arab institution, had started among certain British statesmen and 
scholars, and were especially advanced by Wilfred S. Blunt into the early 
1880s.15 The third dimension was an exacerbation of this question by mem-
bers of the Ottoman opposition abroad (such as Ali Şefkati) who had been 
 
 
13 See Nuray Bozbora, Osmanlı Yönetiminde Arnavutluk ve Arnavut Ulusçuluğunun Gelişimi 
(Istanbul: Boyut, 1997), 169-229. 
14 See Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, "Osmanlı Suriye'sinde Türk Aleyhtarı İlanlar ve Bunlara Karşı 
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36/1 (2000), 82-91; Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, “The Use of Constitutionalism as a means of opposition 
to Abdülhamid II’s Regime: Constitutionalism among the Syrians,” Civilacademy: Journal of 
Social Sciences, 8/1 (2010), 1-10.  
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1877-1882,” Die Welt des Islams, 36/1 (1996), 59-89; Azmi Özcan, “İngiltere’de Hilafet 
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provided financial support by Hidiv Ismail Pasha
16
, and the publications re-
leased by this group of intellectuals which questioned the concept of an ‘Ot-
toman caliphate’.17 Ultimately, the cumulative effect of a series of events in 
the Arab world, relations between British and the Emir of the Hijaz, the occu-
pation of Egypt by the British, the Mahdi Revolt in Sudan (1883-1885), and 
the publication of articles critical of the Ottoman caliphate in English news-
papers intensified Abdülhamid’s growing suspicions regarding British activi-
ties in the region and their plans to create an Arab state, or an Arab caliphate, 
and thus disband the Ottoman Empire.18 
 
d) Restoring order and central authority in the provinces: the continua-
tion of events that had been initiated in 1871, along with the war with Russia, 
led to turmoil not just in the regions affected by the war but in all the provinc-
es of the empire, especially in the border regions and tribal areas, where the 
authority of the state was under serious threat. In the period between 1878 and 
1882, the Abdülhamid regime’s chief priority was to secure peace and order, 
and restore central authority in all of the empire’s provinces so that the reform 
program that would help the ‘sick man’ recover could commence in earnest. 
 
 
The Post-Berlin Treaty Period (III): Proposals and Attempts at Reform 
 
 
With the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, the issue of the policy of reform 
across the empire, in Anatolia and the Arab provinces in particular, became 
the most pressing concern. Abdülhamid, along with ministers such as Ahmed 
Cevdet Pasha and Küçük Said Pasha, were fully aware that tranquillity and 
stability were required on the domestic front for implementation of a reform 
program. As soon as the treaty was signed, the Sultan immediately turned his 
attention to the question of reform (ıslahat); and the question of reforms in 
the Ottoman centre and provinces was high on the agenda and persistently so. 
From then on, whenever a resolution, or some semblance of coherence, was 
brought to the domestic and foreign problems outlined above, the reform pro-
jects would gain momentum. 
 
In the post-Berlin Treaty period, Abdülhamid, on his own initiative, ei-
ther personally dictated or asked to be penned a number of memoranda con-
cerning the reform proposals, one of which, a detailed report dated 1879 and 
which included observations on a wide range of topics from military matters 
 
 
16  
Sultan Abdülhamid had dismissed Ismail Pasha from his post in June 1879; and in order to 
apply pressure to the Sultan, Ismail Pasha supported the opposition.  
17 Buzpınar, “Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate”; Şerif Mardin, “Libertarian Movements in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1878-1895,” Middle East Journal, 16/2 (1962), 169-182. 
18 Mehmed Hocaoğlu, Abdülhamid Han ve Muhtıraları (Istanbul: Selekte Yayıncılık, 1989), 
126. Also see Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, “The Hijaz, Abdülhamid II and Amir Hussein’s Secret Dealings 
with the British,” Middle Eastern Studies, 31/1 (1995), 99-123; Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, "Vying for 
Power and Influence in the Hijaz: Ottoman Rule, the Last Emirate of Abdulmuttalib and the 
British, 1880-1882," The Muslim World, 95 (2005), 1-22. 
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to financial issues.19 Briefs and reports written, either at the request of the 
sultan or on their own initiative, by high officials of the time, including Ah-
med Cevdet Pasha, Küçük Said Pasha, Kamil Pasha, Tunuslu Hayrettin Pasha 
and Safvet Pasha, can be found in the Yıldız Archive. Another enterprise of 
note during this period was the detailed report on reforms penned by a com-
mission headed by Hasan Fehmi Pasha, the Minister for Public Works, and 
presented to the Grand Vizier’s office in June 1880. After being shelved for 
some time, for reasons unknown, the report re-emerged during Küçük Said 
Pasha’s third term in office as grand vizier as part of a wider reform package, 
and it was approved for implementation by the sultan in November 1882.20 
Around this time, there were also various reform attempts in the provinces. 
Taking Iraq as an example, at the end of 1879 and the beginning of 1880, the 
Sultan, who took a particular interest in the issue of reform in Iraq, requested 
briefs from high officials stationed in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul regarding 
the problems and requirements of the areas under their jurisdiction.21 
 
On the other hand, as per both the Cyprus Convention and the Treaty 
of Berlin, the British government had begun to raise the question of reform in 
the Armenian -populated provinces. Furthermore, Sir Henry Layard, the Brit-
ish ambassador, in line with both London as well as the Sultan’s request (ei-
ther as a delaying tactic or because Layard’s knowledge and experience were 
genuinely trusted), penned a number of briefs between 1878 and 1879 on the 
issue of reform in the Ottoman provinces.22 
 
 
The Post-Berlin Treaty Period (IV): The Sultan’s Purges 
 
As the intensely difficult and complex problems elaborated above, along with 
the arduous attempts at reform, continued, it can also be seen that around this 
time, Abdülhamid began a purging of some statesmen he had inherited upon 
his coronation, replacing them with a cadre of personnel that would be both 
closer in line with his own thinking and loyal to him, in the light of his obser-
vations and trials since ascending the throne. While certain civil and military 
members of his staff were promoted, others were demoted. 
 
The Sultan limited the influence of some powerful grandees whom he 
considered dangerous or inimical to his own thinking, based upon their activi-
ties in the period between 1875 and 1878 and, in particular, the roles they 
played in the deposing of Sultan Abdülaziz. Whilst exile to distant provinces 
 
 
19 Stanford Shaw, “A Promise of Reform: Two Complementary Documents,” International 
Jour-nal of Middle East Studies, 4 (1973), 359-68.  
20 Celal Dinçer, “Osmanlı Vezirlerinden Hasan Fehmi Paşa’nın Anadolu’nun Bayındırlık İşlerine 
Dair Hazırladığı Lâyiha,” Belgeler: Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, V-VIII/9-12 (1968-71), 153-  
233.  
21 For details, see Gökhan Çetinsaya, The Ottoman Administration of Iraq (London: 
Routledge, 2006), 25-27. 
22 PRO, FO 198/90, Memorials by Sir A. H. Layard to the Sultan regarding the state of the Otto-
man Empire, reforms, etc. 1878-1879. 
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or new appointments that were exile in all but name were sufficient measures 
in dealing with some of them, for others, most notably the leaders of May 
1876 coup d’état, more serious punishments were required. In this regard, 
(apart from Serasker Hüseyin Avni Pasha, who was killed in June 1876), 
Midhat Pasha, Rüşdi Pasha, and Hayrullah Efendi were all severely punished 
(the Yıldız Trials).23 The intellectual circle known as the Young Ottomans, 
including figures such as Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha, men that had given 
their support to the constitutional regime, were also summarily neutralized. 
 
At the same time, the Sultan began forming his own cadre and gath-
ered around him men that, since his ascension, had gained his trust and prov-
en their loyalty, those that could be considered the more conservative of the 
Tanzimat statesmen and who had been sceptical towards the concept of con-
stitutionalism, and with no role to play in the deposing of Sultan Abdülaziz. 
Amongst those that were trusted by Abdülhamid during this period were Ah-
met Cevdet Pasha, Tunuslu Hayreddin Pasha, Mahmut Nedim Pasha, Uryan-
izade Ahmed Esad Efendi, Rauf Pasha, Safvet Pasha, Arifi Pasha, Küçük Said 
Pasha, Derviş Pasha, Nusret Pasha and Yusuf Rıza Pasha. In this regard, the 
series of cabinet reshuffles during this period cannot be considered out of the 
ordinary as it was during this time that Abdülhamid was testing the limits of 
his authority as well as the loyalties and proclivities of his staff.
24 
 
1881-1882 can be considered the years in which the transition period 
came to an end and in which the Abdülhamid regime fully commenced. In 
this regard, we can speak of two turning points, namely the Yıldız Trials (July 
1881) and, the Decree of Muharram (December 1881) and the founding of the 
Ottoman Public Debt Administration (Düyun-ı Umumiye) (May 1882). With 
the Yıldız Trials, we see the end of the purging and the completion, in terms 
of domestic affairs, of Abdülhamid’s transition period. The establishment of 
Public Debt Administration, along with the ratification of an agreement in 
May 1882 guaranteeing the payment of war reparations to the Russians, sig-
nalled the conclusion of the remaining issues pertaining to the Treaty of Ber-
lin. Thus, potentially destabilizing foreign issues had been dealt with, and 
opponents had been expunged, whilst the sparks of Albanian nationalism and 
Arabism had been extinguished, and the reform process had been initiated. 
Issues that persisted through 1880 were, by the end of 1882, no longer on the 
agenda. With the end of the transition period, the central domestic and foreign 
policies of his regime could now begin to be implemented.25 
 
 
23 Among them, the most tragic tale is that of Midhat Pasha. See Tufan Buzpınar-Gökhan 
Çetinsaya, “Midhat Paşa,” TDVİ A, XXX, 7- 11; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Midhat ve Rüştü 
Paşaların Tevkiflerine Dair Vesikalar (Ankara: TTK, 1987); İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Midhat 
Paşa ve Yıldız Mahkemesi (Ankara: TTK, 1967); Uzunçarşılı, Midhat Paşa ve Taif 
Mahkumları. See also İnal, Son Sadrazamlar, III, 1289. 
24 See Danişmend, Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi, vol 5, 88 ff.  
25 For the nature and principles of the Abdülhamid regime, see F.A.K. Yasamee, Ottoman Diplo-
macy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers, 1878-1888 (Istanbul: Isis, 1996), s.19-39; Gökhan 
Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, s.10-12; Gökhan Çetinsaya, “II. Abdülhamid’in İç 
Politikası: Bir Dönemlendirme Denemesi, The Journal of Ottoman Studies, 47 (2016), 373-384. 
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3) The Period of 1882-1891 
 
With domestic and foreign concerns either resolved or pacified and new poli-
cies formulated, and with a handpicked administrative cadre in place, a new 
period of relative stability began. In this period, although there still occurred 
foreign policy crises, they did not influence or change the course of domestic 
politics. Two issues occupied the agendas of the ‘Eastern Question’ and the 
parties to the Treaty of Berlin: the issues of Egypt and Eastern Rumelia. 
 
Firstly, to complete the picture, it is also necessary to mention the oc-
cupation of Tunisia by the French (April-May 1881), an event that may be 
viewed as a part, or indeed, a consequence of the revisions and redistributions 
of the post- Berlin process. Although nothing was formally promised in the 
text of the Treaty of Berlin, it is an open secret that both Germany and Britain 
encouraged the French occupation of Tunisia, which is why, with the excep-
tion of the Italians, none of the Great Powers objected to occupation. Under 
the circumstances of the time, there was little the Porte could do, in political 
or military terms. 
 
The British occupation of Egypt: Several developments paved the 
way for the occupation of Egypt: the financial crisis that had resulted from the 
crippling debts to Europe; and the reaction in Egypt from the resulting Anglo-
French control of Egyptian finances, alongside the revolt by Egyptian officers 
under Ahmed Urabi (Urabi Pasha). It was during this period that Hidiv Ismail 
Pasha, as a result of British and French pressure on the Porte, was dismissed 
(June 1879) and Tevfik Pasha was appointed as his replacement. The stirrings 
amongst Egyptian officers morphed into a full-scale revolt, and intervention 
by the Great Powers added yet another dimension to the empire’s fragility, 
forcing the Porte to act. As a result of the Urabi Revolt, Ottoman Egypt saw 
the establishment in December 1881 of a constitutional regime, with Ahmed 
Urabi, who had taken part in demonstrations against Anglo-French influence 
in Egypt, being appointed to the Ministry of War (February-May 1882). 
While London was initially tried to persuade the Sultan to embark on a (joint 
or Ottoman) military operation, eventually Britain occupied Egypt and 
crushed the Urabi Revolt (September 1882). The management of this crisis 
not only created a rift between Istanbul and London, it also generated tension 
between the palace and the government; considerable frictions arose between 
the Sultan and the grand viziers (Tunuslu Hayreddin Pasha, Küçük Said Pasha 
and Abdurrahman Nureddin Pasha) as to what line of action was to be pur-
sued in Egypt.26 
 
In addition to events in Egypt, developments in Sudan – which served 
only to increase the Sultan’s misgivings regarding British intentions – should 
also be noted. Breaking out in 1881 as a revolt against Cairo and Istanbul and 
then, from 1883 onwards, against the British forces occupying Egypt, the 
 
 
26 Bkz. Süleyman Kızıltoprak, Mısır’da İngiliz İşgali: Osmanlı’nın Diplomasi Savaşı, 1882-1887  
(Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010); Yasamee, Ottoman Diplomacy, 87-100. 
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Mahdist revolt represented a serious challenge to the Ottoman prestige after 
the occupation of Egypt and provided a justification for continued British 
presence in the region. The Abdülhamid regime viewed the rebellion with 
suspicion, seeing it as a British conspiracy (just like the Urabi Revolt) to es-
tablish an Arab government against the Ottoman caliphate. Nevertheless, as 
with the Urabi Revolt, Abdülhamid, despite attempts at persuasion from his 
government, chose not to intervene in the Sudan.27 
 
The Crisis in Eastern Rumelia: The boundaries of the (greater) Bul-
garia created by the Treaty of San Stefano were revised after numerous objec-
tions, most notably by Britain and Austria, at the Congress of Berlin and re-
drawn to create an independent Bulgaria and an autonomous Eastern Rumelia. 
These two entities united with a military coup by Bulgarian nationalist forces in 
1885, an action that was opposed by both the Ottoman government and some of 
the Great Powers, as well as Serbia and Greece. However, the lack of agreement 
and the absence of any joint action by the above meant the unifica-tion and its 
ramifications had to be accepted. Although the Sultan waited for the issue to be 
resolved by the Great Powers, rivalries between the European states meant his 
expectations were not met. The lack of intervention allowed circumstances to 
develop against the interests of the Ottomans until Istanbul had no option left but 
to acquiesce to the unification. Just as he had in other similar situations, 
Abdülhamid chose not to dispatch his troops and intervene, despite 
recommendations of action from his ministers and despite the terms of the 
Treaty of Berlin. In this regard, both crises reaffirmed the Abdülhamid regime’s 
principles and policies; in all these foreign entanglements, the Sultan wavered 
and refused to deploy troops in uncertain military engagements. And, once 
again, as had happened on numerous previous occasions, the crisis strained 
relations between the palace and the government: The Grand Vizier, Said Pasha, 
and some cabinet members were dismissed.28 
 
Nevertheless, despite these foreign debacles, the decade following 
1881 can be seen as a period of –comparative– peace and internal stability. 
The crises came to an end, pressures from abroad decreased, and the Sultan 
began to take a firmer grasp of the reins of power. Another dimension of this 
newfound stability was the harmonizing of relations between the throne and 
the government, a concordance after 1882 that, when compared to the pre-
1882 era, is reflected in the length of the Grand Vizier’s tenure in office.
29
 
The setbacks that were experienced (like Egypt or Eastern Rumelia) did not 
expand into domestic unrest or trigger opposition to the regime.  
During this period of relative calm and stability, we see an acceleration 
of reforms in almost all areas. Where finances allowed, and when the pro-
posed reforms did not contradict the fundamental principles of the regime 
 
 
27 Yasamee, Ottoman Diplomacy, 111-118. Also see F.A.K. Yasamee, “The Ottoman Empire, 
the Sudan and the Red Sea Coast, 1883-1889,” Sinan Kuneralp and Selim Deringil (eds), Studies 
on Ottoman Diplomatic History, V: the Ottomans and Africa (Istanbul: Isis, 1990), 87-102.  
28 Türkgeldi, II, 193-246; Yasamee, Ottoman Diplomacy, 153-178, 197-214, 239-254.  
29 Danişmend, Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi, vol 5, 88 ff. 
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(such as administrative decentralization), the implementation of all the pro-
jects and reforms proposed between 1878 and 1882 began in earnest.30 
 
 
4) The Period of 1891-1897 
 
When examined in the context of the Abdülhamid regime, the period of 1891-
1895 can be seen as a turning point for domestic politics:31 
 
a) Whilst examination of the correspondence in the Yıldız Archive be-
tween the palace and the Porte would suggest that the Grand Viziers before 
1891, Said Pasha and Kamil Pasha in particular, were fairly influential and 
active characters when it came to decision-making, the Grand Viziers ap-
pointed after this period were comparatively weak and lacking in their ante-
cedents’ independence. In particular, after the brief tenures of Said and Kamil 
Pashas during the turbulence of 1895, whom still sought to restore the influ-
ence and authority of the office of Grand Vizier to its previous stature, we see 
a gradual neutralization of the office and the consolidation of direct rule from 
the palace.  
b) At the same time, it can be seen that the ministers and advisors 
whose opinions Abdülhamid valued in the post-1878 period, embodied by 
figures such as Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, passed away in the mid-1890s and that 
after this period, the Sultan began collaborating with a young generation of 
military and civilian bureaucrats, including men such as Mahmut Şevket, 
İbrahim Hakkı and Hüseyin Hilmi (later Pashas), whose careers also contin-
ued during the Second Constitutional Era.  
c) Yıldız Palace assumed a more central and prominent role during this 
period. In this context, the appointment of Cevad Pasha as Grand Vizier in 
September 1891; the arrival of Tahsin Pasha as Chief Secretary (başkatip) in 
 
 
30 For different examples: Selçuk Akşin Somel, The Modernization of Public Education in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline, the Ottoman 
Empire and its Heritage (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Benjamin Fortna, Imperial Classroom: Islam, 
the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire (New York: OUP, 2002); Mehmet 
Alkan, “Modernization from Empire to Republic and Education in the Process of Nationalism,” 
Ottoman Past and To-day’s Turkey, ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden: Brill, 2000), s.47-132; 
Fatmagül Demirel, Adliye Nezareti: Kuruluşu ve Faaliyetleri, 1876-1914 (Istanbul: Boğaziçi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008); Şevket Kamil Akar, ‘Bütçeler Işığında II. Abdülhamid Dönemi 
Maliyesi’ (Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Istanbul Üniversitesi, 1999); Odile Moreau, Reformlar 
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(Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Ün-iversitesi Yayınları, 2010); Donald Quataert, Anadolu’da Osmanlı 
Reformu ve Tarım, 1876-1908 (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008); Carter 
V. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Carter V. Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A 
Social History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).  
31 See Ali Akyıldız, “II. Abdülhamid’in Çalışma Sistemi, Yönetim Anlayışı ve Bâbıâli’yle 
(Hükümet) İlişkileri,” Osmanlı, 2 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 1999), 286-97; Gökhan Çetinsaya, 
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November 1894; the increase in responsibilities and staff at the office of 
chamberlain (mabeyn ); the increase in importance and duties for the office 
of post and telegraph at Yıldız Palace and the mabeyn’s encryption office 
may be mentioned. Additionally, direct petitioning and correspondence 
powers (a privilege that was formerly assigned solely to the offices of the 
Grand Vizier and the Şeyhülislam) with the palace expanded to the offices of 
the Serasker, the Marshal of Tophane, the Minister for the Navy and the 
Ministry oversee-ing the sultan’s private treasury (Hazine-i Hassa), and 
indeed to commissions such as those overseeing the military (Teftiş-i Askeri), 
the treasury, and pur-chasing (Mübayaat Komisyonu).32 
 
d) The Armenian crisis of 1894-1896 was a grave one with numerous 
aspects. At the beginning of the 1890s, the Armenian question had begun to 
surface not just in ‘the Six Provinces’ (vilâyât-ı sitte) of Eastern Anatolia but 
in a number of provinces throughout Anatolia, and eventually in Istanbul too, 
and soon began to debilitate the state both internally and abroad. There were 
three main stages to the Armenian question: the outbreak of violence in Bitlis 
in August 1894; protests against the government by Armenians and subse-
quent incidents in Istanbul in September 1895; and the raid on the Ottoman 
Bank in Istanbul and the taking of hostages in August 1896. These three years 
also saw continuous eruptions of violence in the Anatolian provinces populat-
ed by Armenians, a chain of events that led to the intervention of the Great 
Powers, most notably Britain. This was also when the European press began 
labelling Abdülhamid the ‘Red Sultan’. The challenges and the Sultan’s re-
sponses to this grave crisis can be listed as follows:  
- The Great Powers used the Armenian question as bargaining chips at 
the negotiating table, where they tabled their own solutions. As the issue be-
gan to escalate out of control, meetings, consultations and discussions be-
tween the Great Powers as to how the lands of the ‘sick man’ were to be 
carved up also saw a marked increase. Especially from May 1895 onwards, 
the pressure and demand for reforms in the eastern provinces, as stipulated in 
the Treaty of Berlin, was once more being applied by the Great Powers. Pres-
sure from abroad, intervention and the issuing of threats reached a peak be-
tween December 1896 and January 1897. Abdülhamid’s one of the responses 
would be to play the Great Powers off against one another.  
- In order to resist the pressures, the Sultan also undertook certain pre-
cautions on his own initiative regarding the question of reform in the eastern 
provinces. Accordingly, Abdülhamid appointed in June 1895 of Marshal Ah-
met Şakir Pasha to the General Inspectorate of Anatolia (Anadolu Vilâyât-ı 
Umum Müfettişliği).33 
- Another response was the deployment of the Hamidiye Light Cavalry 
Regiments. Proposed at the end of the 1880s and established in the early 
 
 
32 See Akyıldız, “II. Abdülhamid’in Çalışma Sistemi”; Ali Akyıldız, “Mabeyn-i Hümayun,” 
TDVİA, XXVII, 283-286.  
33 Ali Karaca, Anadolu Islahatı ve Ahmed Şakir Paşa, 1838-1899 (Istanbul: Eren, 1993), 54 ff. 
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1890s, the corps was composed of members of some Kurdish tribes of Anato-
lia as an auxiliary unit to the forces guarding the border with Russia. Howev-
er, with the emergence and rise of the Armenian question, the regiments be-
gan to be used as a de facto counterforce to increasing instances of Armenian 
armed struggle.34 
 
- As was the case whenever the domestic peace was broken and the 
Abdülhamid regime faced serious emergencies, the period witnessed recurrent 
change of the Grand Viziers. For instance, four Grand Viziers were appointed 
in the five months between June and November 1895 alone.  
d) All the above developments – internal unrest and foreign interven-
tion – reignited the opposition to the Abdülhamid regime. Almost fifteen 
years after the purging of the opposition known as the ‘Young Ottomans’, a 
new wave of opposition emerged, this time carrying the name of the ‘Young 
Turks’. At the end of the 1880s and the beginning of the 1890s, dissenting 
movements and organizations began forming amongst students from civil and 
military academies (such as Harbiye, Tıbbiye and Mülkiye), and grew as a 
result of the deepening of the Armenian crisis in the first half of the 1890s. As 
the Armenian question grew day by day between 1894 and 1896 in Anatolia 
and spread to Istanbul, the rebellion morphed into a crisis in which the Euro-
pean states were now involved. Opposition movement now found a foothold 
not only in the military and civil academies but also began to find proponents 
in the military and civilian bureaucracy and amongst religious figures. The 
question of what should be done to counter the threat of the state collapsing 
or, indeed, disintegrating was being aired in various platforms, and once more 
the answer (as formulated in the 1870s) was constitutional regime and, to 
achieve this, coup attempts. Between 1896 and 1897, we see arrests and exiles 
carried out after the prevention of a few planned coups in which members of 
the civil servants, military officers and students of higher schools were in-
volved.35  
e) Finally, with the rapid rise and intensification of these two issues 
(the Armenian question and the rise of political opposition), the character of 
the Abdülhamid regime became even more defined, and autocratic, reflected 
in the increasing levels of censorship and informant activities (jurnal). 
 
 
5) The Period of 1897-1902 
 
In the context of the Abdülhamid regime, the period from 1897 to 1902 is also 
widely accepted as another turning point; indeed, it is, according to Georgeon, 
the “apex”, or highpoint, of his sultanate.36 The Ottoman victory in the 1897 
Greco-Ottoman War was arguably one of the factors that led to this critical 
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36 François Georgeon, Sultan Abdülhamid (Istanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2006), 384. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 G Ö K H A N Ç E T İ N S A Y A 
 
juncture in the regime. It provided the leverage that allowed the regime to 
extricate itself from a grave crisis. 
 
The trigger for the war was the question of Crete. Greek nationalists 
who viewed the weakness the Armenian question had created in the Ottoman 
state as a possible advantage instigated their uprising in Crete in February 
1897. Realizing that they would not achieve their aims on the negotiating ta-
ble, the Greek army crossed the border at Thessaly and thus entered and oc-
cupied Ottoman territory, initiating a short war (17 April-19 May 1897). The 
Ottoman army was successful; and the peace finally agreed in December. One 
result of this military victory for the Abdülhamid regime was an increase in 
prestige in many aspects, both within the empire and amongst the Great Pow-
ers, as well as throughout the wider Islamic world. The victory killed multiple 
birds, to refashion a well -known phrase, with one stone. As a result of this 
demonstration of the regime’s resilience, the Armenian revolutionary organi-
zations as well as the Young Turks put a halt to their activities and the Otto-
man state was thus able to extract itself from the quagmire in which it had 
found itself as a result of the crisis of 1894-1896. Ultimately, this period wit-
nessed: 
 
a) An end to the Armenian armed struggle.  
b) The collapse of the Young Turk opposition.  
c) An end of the Great Powers’ political threats, pressures and inter-
ventions, and the shelving once more of their plans to dismember the Ottoman 
Empire.  
d) Sultan Abdülhamid gained prestige throughout the Islamic world 
and the reaffirmed his legitimacy as Caliph.  
The visit by Kaiser Wilhelm II to Istanbul and Jerusalem in 1898 is 
another event that can be seen as a contributing factor and outcome of this 
chain of events. Kaiser’s visit, as head of Europe’s most formidable power 
and the second most powerful state in the world, and his speeches during his 
visit, reaffirmed the legitimacy of the regime and increased Abdülhamid’s 
prestige in the eyes of the Great Powers and throughout the entire Islamic 
world.  
After the crisis of 1894-1896 had been overcome, a new stability was 
established in the offices of the Grand Vizirate, the ministries and in most of 
the governorships (except for those constantly plagued by problems, such as 
Mosul), all of which may be seen as proof of the stability of this period.37 In 
general, this restoration of relative calm and confidence added momentum to 
the reform process and brought the package of planned reforms and large-
scale investments, long-term projects included, to the fore of the agenda once 
more. The crowning moment of this period, arguably, was the jubilee of 1 
September 1900 marking the twenty-fifth year of Abdülhamid’s reign. As a 
part of the jubilee celebrations, the foundations for two major projects were 
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laid: that of the Hijaz Railway and the reopening of the Darülfünun (Istanbul 
University). 
 
 
6) The Period of 1902-1908 
 
Upon closer evaluation of the rapidly and increasingly frequent incidents that 
paved the way for the collapse of the regime in 1908, after several years of 
relative stability and peace, a period that is perceived as a highpoint, or zenith, 
for the regime can also be seen as the beginning of the end. During this peri-
od, the stability that had been existent since the second half of the 1890s in 
the premiership, the ministries and most of the governorships was still very 
much in place. 
 
In this period, some accounts testify to the almost absolute transfer-
ence of power to the palace and emphasize the neutralization of the office of 
the Grand Vizier. For instance, according to İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal, dur-
ing his sixth term in office (November 1901- January 1903), Said Pasha could 
not reach concordance in any substantial manner with the Sultan.38 It was also 
a period in which use of informers’ reports (jurnal) were at their greatest. The 
testimonies left by foreign and Ottoman witnesses would suggest that from 
1900/1901 onwards, the Sultan was entirely under the influence of his ‘palace 
cadre’. There would also be struggles for power between factions (led by 
Tahsin Pasha and Arap Izzet Pasha) within this palace staff.39 
 
The period after 1902 saw a rapid increase in a series of foreign policy 
problems and in domestic issues directly related to foreign policy, and the 
regime became increasingly ineffectual in the face of these growing conflicts, 
its ability to resolve the issues it faced being all but lost.  
a) The Persian Gulf and Kuwait: The trigger for the rise in Anglo-
Ottoman tensions at the turn of the century, aside from the Baghdad Railway 
project and an increasing German presence in the region, was the sudden out-
break in May 1896 of the Kuwait Crisis. Sheikh Muhammed al-Sabah, the 
kaymakam of Kuwait, which had been an Ottoman provincial sub-district 
(ka-za) since 1871, was killed by his stepbrother Mubarak al-Sabah in May 
1896. Worried that the British were attempting to increase their influence in 
the Basra region and that their intention was to establish an Arab government 
or confederation that would include the Jabal Shammar, Najd, Qatar, Bahrain 
and Kuwait, the Ottoman government, after prolonged negotiations, endorsed 
Mubarak’s position as new kaymakam in December 1897. Disturbed by the 
myriad railway projects underway in the region and rival states’ interest in the 
Gulf, London signed a secret agreement with Sheikh Mubarak in January 
1899. Despite several military and logistical counter-measures, Istanbul was 
forced to accept the fact that Kuwait was now under British patronage. A con- 
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cordance was eventually reached, whereby Britain would not occupy Kuwait, 
nor would it officially declare its guardianship over the sub-district; however, 
in return, the Porte would not dispatch or station troops to Kuwait and would 
have to accept the new status quo.40 Of even greater gravity was the reaction 
by London to the Sultan granting privileges over the Baghdad Railway to the 
German-controlled Anatolian Railway Company and his proposal that the 
terminal station in the Gulf region be built in Kuwait (November 1899). The 
rivalry in Kuwait and the wider Gulf region intensified yet further in the early 
1900s. Contacts between British officials and the Gulf emirs and the sheikhs 
of Najd were being closely monitored by the local Ottoman officials. 
 
Whilst the Kuwait issue raged on unresolved, the question of Najd, in 
Eastern Arabia, added to existing tensions. Since 1900, Sheikh Mubarak had 
begun to take an active interest in the affairs of the region of Najd, and was an 
active participant in the struggle for leadership of the region between Ibn 
Saud and Ibn Rashid. Sheikh Sadun of the Muntafiq tribe, the largest of the 
tribal confederations of Basra, and Ibn Saud, as allies, Sheikh Mubarak chal-
lenged Ibn Rashid, seen at the time as a client of Sultan Abdülhamid’s. From 
1902 onwards, clashes broke out, with Ottoman military units also involved; 
in 1904, a large military force was dispatched to the Najd by the Porte to con-
front Ibn Saud.41 
 
As the disputes in the Gulf and Eastern Arabia detailed above raged 
on, suspicions in Istanbul and amongst local Ottoman officials that the British 
were pursuing a hostile policy in the Gulf region remained and were intensi-
fied yet further by disputes over Suez, the Red Sea and the Yemen in the early 
1900s.42 
 
b) The Yemeni Rebellions: Insurgencies against the Ottomans by the 
Zaidis in Yemen, which had been reclaimed by the Ottoman Empire in 1872, 
continued apace and towards the end of 1904, the Zaidi tribes, under the lead-
ership of Imam Yahya, who had proclaimed himself caliph, initiated another 
wave of rebellions with the aim of securing self-government. The Ottoman 
forces proved ineffective in the face of these rebellions and in April 1905, 
Sana’a fell to the rebels. In Istanbul, the feeling that the English were some-
how involved in this incident prevailed. In 1906, Ahmed Feyzi Pasha, Field 
Marshal of the Sixth Army stationed in Iraq, reclaimed Sana’a after a huge 
military operation against the rebels and the insurgency, aside from that led 
by Sheikh of Asir, was crushed. Nevertheless, disturbances continued to break 
out in Yemen.43 
 
 
40 See Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 138-141.  
41 Bkz. Zekeriya Kurşun, Necid ve Ahsa’da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti (Ankara: TTK, 1998); 
Frederick F. Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).  
42 See John Burman, Britain’s Relations with the Ottoman Empire during the Embassy of 
Sir Nicholas O’Conor to the Porte, 1898-1908 (Istanbul: Isis, 2010).  
43 See Ceasar Farah, Sultan’s Yemen: 19th century challenges to Ottoman rule (London: I. 
B. Tauris, 2002); Spencer Mawby, “A Crisis of Empire: The Anglo-Ottoman Dispute over the 
Aden Frontier, 1901-1905,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 18/1 (2007), 27-52. 
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c) The Aqaba Crisis: For some time, border disputes between English-
controlled Egypt and Ottoman-controlled the Sinai had been averted. Howev-
er, with the expansion of the Hijaz Railway towards the Gulf of Aqaba, this 
tension was once more reignited and a crisis erupted in January 1906 with the 
dispatching of Ottoman troops to Taba. Once more, the Ottomans and the 
British were embroiled in a military and diplomatic standoff. After prolonged 
negotiations, an agreement was reached in October 1906; according to the 
terms, Ottoman forces would withdraw but Taba would remain under Otto-
man sovereignty. One of the factors that led to this incident becoming such a 
grave diplomatic crisis was the British concerns at the rise of ‘Islamic nation-
alism’ or Pan-Islamic currents of thought, and growth of support for the Ot-
toman Caliphate in Egypt.44  
d) Iraq: A further source of concern for the Abdülhamid regime at this 
time were military reports detailing the distribution of weapons by the British 
to the tribes of Iraq and Eastern Arabia or of British officials turning a blind 
eye to arms smuggling in the region. The consequence of this acquisition of 
modern weapons, be it in Mosul or in Basra, was a rapid escalation of tribal 
insurgencies in the early 1900s, which Ottoman forces were unable to quell. 
During this period, Ottoman administrators in Iraq were occupied with vari-
ous reform projects, as well as having to deal with a series of insurgencies 
that had broken out especially in the province of Basra. As the local tensions 
between the British and the Ottomans as outlined above increased, regional 
officials, as well as those in Istanbul, articulated their frustrations to British 
officials and visitors in Iraq. Local Ottoman officials saw the British schem-
ing behind the tribal insurgencies, and with each passing day, more and more 
barriers were placed in front of English officials and travellers.45  
After 1905, the Shia issue in Iraq, in which both Britain and Iran took a 
keen interest, assumed an entirely new dimension. The constitutional move-
ment in Iran, alongside other turbulent issues between 1905 and 1911, had a 
major effect on Ottoman Iraq.46 The aforementioned developments – increas-
ing British activities and interventions in all of the Middle East, developments 
in the Persian Gulf and in Arabia, increasing uprisings in Iraq and the rise of 
the Shia mujtahids of Iraq as a result of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution  
– meant Ottoman attentions were once more focused on the problems in Iraq 
and attempts at both resolving the Shia question as well as instigating a gen-
eral reform program intensified after 1905.47  
e) The border with Iran: Sensing an opportunity ensuing from the stra-
tegic vacuum that had been created as a result of the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution, Ottoman forces staged a sudden occupation of the area from Ba- 
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yazit to Vazne, a source of dispute with Iran, and remained stationed there 
until 1913. England and Russia, which had taken an active role in the issue of 
the Ottoman-Iranian border since the 1840s, were again involved in this pro-
cess.48 
An analysis from a broader perspective shows that during this period, 
the Abdülhamid regime faced serious problems within the empire, especially 
in the tribal and the border regions. Cowed by various internal actors in these 
contentious areas, on every occasion Istanbul came face to face with a formi-
dable external actor, namely Britain. The Porte was determined to protect its 
interests in the face of these British ‘transgressions’, but without any direct 
confrontation. Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 further deepened Ottoman 
reluctance to risk direct confrontation with Britain. Although the issue of the 
Persian Gulf may not have been openly discussed, Abdülhamid was worried 
that a secret agreement on the issue had been reached by the two powers. The 
sultan requested a report from the Russian and British ambassadors clarifying 
the actual details of the discussions, and, indeed, expressly asked whether the 
Ottoman regions in and around the Persian Gulf had been the subject of any 
real or potential agreement between the two powers. And he showed an ex-
press interest in reconciling relations with Britain, or, at least, in avoiding 
direct confrontation.49 
 
f) ‘Popular’ discontent and disturbances: Between 1905 and 1907, the 
Black Sea and the Eastern Anatolian provinces witnessed a series of popular 
disturbances led by the local notables (eşraf). Although the circumstances 
and reasons behind each incident may have been different, a broader overview 
shows that these were symptomatic of a general discontent in the Anatolian 
provinces with the regime.50  
- At the end of 1905 and the beginning of 1906, a popular movement 
emerged in Kastamonu, a place of exile, demanding exemption from payment 
of the animal tax (ağnam). 
- Two popular movements broke out in October 1906 and December 
1907 in Trabzon, the port from which troops assigned to Yemen were trans-
ferred.  
- Large popular movements were seen in Diyarbakır in August 1905, 
January 1906 and November 1907 against the heavy-handed rule of Ibrahim 
Pasha, influential commander of one of the Hamidiye Corps and chief of the 
Milli tribe.  
- The most critical incident, however, took place between 1906 and 
1907 in Erzurum. Starting in February 1906 as a protest against the animal 
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tax, the movement grew until it began to challenge the legitimacy of the Sul-
tan’s rule in Erzurum itself. The uprising was quelled by the military in No-
vember 1907. 
 
- Alongside these developments, various incidents also took place dur-
ing this period in places as diverse as Van, Çemişgezek, Çorum, Bitlis, Siirt 
and Kerbala.51  
When examining these uprisings and rebellions, it can be seen that the 
causes were either tax burdens, deteriorating economic conditions, the dis-
patching of troops to Yemen or the heavy-handedness of local governors or 
Hamidiye commanders. In other words, causes that were rooted in local ad-
ministrative and economic issues that led to widespread popular disenchant-
ment. Such popular movements had been witnessed before 1905. However, 
these movements now emerged in conditions that were favourable for exploi-
tation by political opposition groups. As seen in the case of Erzurum, whereby 
local dissatisfaction and dissent were used by both the Committee of Union 
and Progress (CUP) and by the coalition between Prince Sabahaddin group 
and the Dashnak (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) to their respective 
advantage in their demands for constitutional reform. The palace and the gov-
ernment initially resisted these movements, but once these forces began to 
spiral out of control, they opted for the path of conciliation and acquiesced to 
most of the demands; many of the taxes were either delayed or outright abol-
ished and officials that had been the subject of complaints were dismissed 
from their posts. However, in Erzurum, which had fallen to the rebels and in 
which the constitutionalists were now growing in influence and bravado, mili-
tary force was used.52 
 
g) Mutinies in military units: Between 1906 and 1908, as a result of 
unpaid wages or due to troops being dispatched to Yemen, a series of muti-
nies occurred in various army units. Although such incidents had occurred 
before, they too now created opportunities for opposition groups.  
Despite these myriad problems in the Middle East and the pervasive 
sense of unease in the Anatolian and Arab provinces, the issue that truly broke 
the Abdülhamid regime and brought it to an end was the Macedonian ques-
tion. Emboldened by the regime’s ineffectiveness in this crucial issue, the 
opposition grew in strength. The fatal blow to the regime was the founding of 
the Committee of Union and Progress by a group of young officers and offi-
cials stationed in Macedonia.  
h) The Macedonian Question: Due to acts of brigandage that had per-
sisted in the region since 1901, Macedonia had once again become firmly 
entrenched in the Great Powers’ agenda. In September 1902, an uprising de-
manding autonomy broke out, and the issue soon assumed an international 
dimension. Realizing the 1897 agreement between Austria and Russia over 
the Balkans was still effective, the Sultan, bowing to pressure from the two 
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powers and his own statesmen, reneged on his regime’s principles and issued 
a decree (November 1902), promising reforms in the provinces of Manastır 
(Bitola), Salonika and Kosovo. This decree, whilst expanding the authority of 
local governors and agreeing to the establishment of joint police and gendar-
merie units, also founded the General Inspectorate of the Three Provinces 
(vilâyât-ı selâse umum müfettişliği), with Hüseyin Hilmi Paş a appointed as 
its head (December 1902) . Nevertheless, this did not bring the unrest to an 
end; indeed, the unrest increased, and rapidly, and as they did so, Great Power 
in-tervention, most notably by Russia and Austria, also increased. In February 
1903, Austria and Russia’s joint reform program for Macedonia was an-
nounced. From April 1903 onwards, the uprisings and attempts at sabotage 
continued apace and in August 1903, a general uprising began that would last 
three months. In October 1903, the Mürzsteg Reform Plan as dictated by Aus-
tria and Russia was announced. Yıldız had no choice but to acquiesce and 
thus an era of foreign domination began in Macedonia. The crucial turning 
point in the question of Macedonia, however, occurred in December 1907 
with renewed Great Power intervention in the region: the Austro-Russian coa-
lition broke down, and Anglo-Russian coalition began fully intervening.53 
 
For the Young Turk opposition movement, the Macedonian Question was 
the main incentive. Concerns that Macedonia would be wrenched away from the 
Ottomans by the Great Powers and that the Ottoman Empire was being led to 
collapse raised concerns and discussions amongst general staff officers of the Third 
Army stationed in Macedonia as to how the state could be rescued. And once more, 
the magic formula that had been articulated since the 1870s as the solution to all the 
empire’s internal and external problems was espoused. The malady was the same: 
rebellions by non-Muslims were being met by force, which was then followed by 
intervention by foreign pow-ers. The cure for this ailment, which would work for 
the non- Muslims and the foreign powers, as well for as the majority of civil and 
military bureaucrats and the intellectuals, was the same: a constitutional regime 
(meşrutiyet). 
 
i) The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP): 1906 proved to be a 
critical year for the Young Turk opposition movement. In September 1906, a 
secret committee (Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti) was founded in Salonika. In 
September 1907, the Paris and Salonika-based committees united under a 
single organization known as the Committee of Union and Progress. At the 
same time, shifting regional and international currents created momentum for 
the Young Turks. The 1905 Constitutional Revolution in Russia, the 1906 
Constitutional Revolution in Iran, and the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907, in 
this context, transformed international and regional environment to the detri-
ment of the Abdülhamid regime and in favour of the Young Turks. 
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The Anglo-Russian Entente was not restricted to a regional and inter-
national balance of power but rather, in the context of the Abdülhamid re-
gime, brought to an end the political balance that had been pursued in foreign 
affairs, raising fears of the possible breakup (as had been the case in Iran and 
Afghanistan) of the Ottoman Empire. The first fruits of the Anglo -Russian 
Convention were borne in the Balkans. By the end of 1907 and the beginning 
of 1908, Russia and Britain began a period of cooperation in Macedonia and 
also began to press the other European powers to apply greater pressure on 
Istanbul.54 
 
The momentum created by these events generated huge political ener-
gy amongst the military units in Macedonia. As Anglo-Russian pressure in-
creased and the realization grew that European tutelage would be imposed not 
only on Macedonia but all the Ottoman provinces in the Balkans, the sense of 
unease amongst two significant sections of society in the region – the notables 
of Macedonia and Albania, and Ottoman military officers stationed in the 
region – reached new levels and the groundwork for collaboration between 
these groups was established. It was at the meeting at Reval in June 1908 be-
tween the Russian Tsar and the King of England that the fuse was lit and in 
July 1908 the wave of uprisings in the Macedonian provinces instigated by 
military officers that were members of the CUP brought the Abdülhamid re-
gime to its end.55 Undoubtedly, exhaustion and enervation on the part of the 
Sultan, both in terms of age and the demands of rule, were also factors in this 
demise.  
When viewed from a general perspective, the Abdülhamid regime 
faced three grave challenges for a full thirty-three years: the Russo-Ottoman 
war of 1877-1878 and its aftermath, the Armenian Question (1894-1896) and 
the Macedonian Question (1902-1908) . Throughout these crises, a vicious 
circle remains constant: internal rebellion by non-Muslims; military response 
by the state; reactions by the Great Powers to the military response to these 
rebellions; pressure and intervention by the Great Powers. All the above de-
velopments – internal unrest and foreign intervention – reignited the opposi-
tion to the Abdülhamid regime; the question of what should be done to coun-
ter the threat of the state collapsing or, indeed, disintegrating was being aired 
in various platforms, and once more the answer (as formulated in the 1870s) 
was constitutional regime. When solutions were found to these crises, as in 
1897, the stability and continuity of the regime was sustained; however, when 
an impasse was reached, as in 1908, the regime could no longer be maintained 
and was thus overthrown. 
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